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Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

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R 021538Z DEC 74
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9023
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 5256

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NO, UR
SUBJECT: KEKKONEN PLAN AND NORWEGIAN SECURITY

REF: OSLO 5199

SUMMARY. NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS ARE QUESTIONING WHAT MAY LIE BEHIND MOSCOW'S CURRENT ATTENTION TO THE KEKKONEN PLAN TO MAKE SCANDINAVIA A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. THEY DO NO SEE EXACTLY HOW IT FITS INTO THE PATTERN OF CURRENT DELICATE SOVIET-NORWEGIAN NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE BARENTS SEA, BUT ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE THEY EXPECT THAT THE ISSUE OF SOVIET SECURITY IN THE NORTH WILL BE INTRODUCED IN SOME FASHION INTO THE NEXT PHASE OF NEGOTPIATIONS ON DELIMITATION OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF. THEY ARE ALSO SENSITIVE TO ANY SOVIET MOVES WHICH MAY COMPLICATE THE CURRENT DEBATE WITHIN NORWAY OVER MODERNIZATION OF THE DEFENSE FORCES. OSLO ANTICIPATES THAT THE
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SOVIETS WILL LOOK FOR CONCESSIONS IN THE AREA OF CONTROLLING OFF-SHORE

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SHORE OIL OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLE JOINT EXPOLITATION IN THE

BARENTS SEA, BUT DOES NOT TOTALLY DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME PROBE IN THE ARMS LIMITATION FIELD. SEEN FROM OSLO MOSCOW'S POLICY OF DETENTE REMAINS THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOVIET WEAPON FOR OVERCOMING NORWEGIAN HESITANCY TO COOPERATE BILATERALLY WITH THE USSR IN THE NORTH, AND FOR WEAKENING OVER TIME NORWAYS'S TIES TO NATO AND ITS DEFENSE POSTURE. THE KEKKONEN PLAN, WHICH WOULD OSTENSIBLY REMOVE THE NEED FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR UMBRELLA OVER NORWAY AND DENMARK, IS LOGICAL IF UNEXCITING ELEMENT IN THIS SOVIET DETENTE POLICY. END SUMMARY.

1. NORWEGIAN REACTION. NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS ARE PUZZLED (AS WE ARE) WHY THE USSR SHOULD WISH TO PLACE SUCH STRESS ON THE KEKKONEN PLAN AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT, AND HOW THIS MAY FIT INTO THE BRADER SCHEME OF SOVIET-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS. DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS VIBE HAS SPECULATED THAT MOSCOW MAY CONSIDER THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE FAVORABLE FOR ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL STATUS OF NORTHERN EUROPE-- WHICH WOULD PROVIDE USSR INTER ALIA WITH PRETEXT FOR INTERFERING IN NORWEGIAN DEFENSE PLANNING. BUT HE ALSO MADE VERY CLEAR (AS HAS HIM MINISTER PREVIOUSLY) THAT KEKKONEN PLAN HAS NO APPEAL IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES. REACTING PERHAPS TO FACT PODGORNYY SPRANG HIS ENDORSEMENT OF PLAN ON EVE OF NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER'S TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE, BRATTELI WENT OUT OF HIS WAY IN BOTH POLAND AND HUNGARY TO MAKE CLEAR IT WAS A NON-STARTER. THOUGH INCLINED TO DISMISS PLAN AS OLD CHESTNUT, NORWEGIANS ALSO APPEAR IRRITATED BY ITS NEW PROMINENCE AND UNSURE WHETER THEY MAY NOT BE SEEING TIP OF SOVIET ICEBERG WITH UNPLESANT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE SURFACE.

2. SOVIET COMMENTARY. SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON KEKKONEN PLAN (NOV. 12 AND 22 FBIS) ARE NOT VERY HELPFUL IN ANSWERING A) WHY NOW? AND B) IS PROPOSAL ANY MORE PRECISELY TARGETED THAN THE USUAL PROPAGANDA INTENDED TO PORTRAY USSR AS A PEACE-SEEKING COUNTRY? SINCE, ACCORDING TO PRAVDA, FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE COULD LEAD TO CREATION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN NORTHERN EUROPE, IT WOULD SEEM PREMATURE TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON PLAN WHILE CSCE HAS STILL MANY MONTHS TO GO. ACCEPTANCE OF KEKKONEN PLAN IS PICTURED BY PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA IN ESSENTIALLY DETENTE FRAMEWORK AS "EXCLUDING CONFIDENTIAL

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THE TERRITORES OF NORTHER EUROPEAN STATES FROM SPHERE OF THE ARMS RACE," WITH IZVESTIYA ADDING THAT IT WOULD "FURTHER IMPROVE SITUATION THROUGHOUT EUROPE AS A WHOLE." IZVESTIYA ALSO LINKS THE PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, TO THE MORE SPECIFIC MILITARY GOAL OF DENUCLEARIZING SCANDINAVIA, NOTING THAT "CERTAIN NATO CIRCLES... WISH TO RESERVE AN "ATOMIC LOOPHOLE" FOR THEMSTEVES IN SCANDINAVIA," NOTWITHSTANDING THE ANNOUNCED POSITION OF THE NORWEGIAN, DANISH AND SWEDISH GOVERNMENTS ON THIS QUESTION.

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CONTRIBUTION TO DETENTE ATMOSPHERE? IT WOULD BE LOGICAL
FOR THE USSR TO TRY TO EXPLOIT ANY FAVORABLE OUTCOME OF CSCE
TO GIVE ADDED MOMENTUM TO POPULAR FEELINGS OF DETENTE. THE FACT
THAT THE USSR DID NOT WAIT UNTIL THE CSCE WAS CLOSER TO COMPLETION
TO PUSH KEKKONEN PLAN COULD BE EXPLAINED, HOWEVER, ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE ANNUAL DEBATE AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS PREVIOUSLY
PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO FOCUS DEBATE ON THE QUESTION OF ATOM-FREE
ZONES, AND THIS YEAR IS NO EXCEPTION. SOVIETS MAY HOPE THAT, IN THE
PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY WHEN PEOPLES AND
PARLIAMENTS MAY BE RELUCTANT TO APPROPRIATE LARGE SUMS FOR DEFENSE,
EVEN THE FAMILIAR KEKKONEN PLAN MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS DETENTE GOAL.

4. AIMED AT SCANDINAVIAN DEFENSE? IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT
TIMING OF KEKKONEN PLAN PROPAGANDA IS ALSO RELATED TO DEFENSE
PLANNING IN SCANDINAVIA. VIBE SPECULATED THAT SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE
BEEN CONCERNED BY RECENT DISCUSSION IN SWEDISH PRESS OF DESIRABILITY
OF ACQUIRING MINI-NUKES. CONCEIVABLY SOVIETS ARE ALSO CONCERNED
THAT DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY IN SWEDEN (OPPOSITION
REMAINS GREATER IN NORWAY) COULD OPEN DOOR TO DEVELOPMENT OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SEEN FROM NORWAY, AT LEAST, SUCH CONCERN DOES
NOT APPEAR VERY REASONABLE. BUT IT WOULD PROVIDE THE MOST
LOGICAL EXPLANATION FOR RENEWED SOVIET STRESS ON THE KEKKONEN
PLAN.

5. AT VERY LEAST, USSR REMAINS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS AND PREVENTIVE-
ORIENTED IN ITS GENERAL APPROACH TO SECURITY PROBLEMS, AS
ILLUSTRATED BY SOVIET EFFORTS IN CONNECTION WITH BRATTELI'S

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PM-03 COA-01 SAJ-01 RSC-01 OES-02 DODE-00 NSC-05

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9024
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

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USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
USMISSION NATO
USMISSION UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 2 OSLO 5256

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VISIT LAST MARCH TO EXTRACT NEW COMMITMENTS THAT NORWAY REMAINED OPPOSED TO FOREIGN BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS SOIL. MOSCOW IS ALSO QUITE AWARE THAT: NORWAY, DENMARK AND PERHAPS SWEDEN HAVE ALL RETAINED THE OPTION TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF THREATENED A SPECIAL NORWEGIAN DEFENSE COMMISSION IS PRESENTLY REEXAMINING THE BASIS FOR FUTURE DEFENSE POLICY IN ALL FIELDS; NORWEGIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY IS STUDYING SEPARATELY WHAT INCREASED NAVAL

AND AIR FORCES IT NEEDS TO ENFORCE ITS SOVEREIGNTY ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OFF NORTHERN AS WELL AS WESTERN EUROPE, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INTENSE PRESS INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT; DECISION MUST BE MADE EARLY NEXT YEAR WHAT FIGHTER THE FOUR CONSORTIUM COUNTRIES, INCLUDING DENMARK AND NORWAY, WILL PURCHASE TO REPLACE THE F-104; AND NORWEGIANS ALSO HOPE TO PURCHASE SOME FORM OF ALL-WEATHER-SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. GIVEN THIS EXTENSIVE ATTENTION TO MODERNIZATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN NORWAY AND ELSEWHERE IN
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SCANDINAVIA, AND THE TREND THAT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF PLANES AND MISSILES ARE NUCLEAR-CAPABLE, MOSCOW MAY FEEL THAT SOME EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO HAMPER A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM WHICH, WHILE COMPARATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT, WILL AFFECT THE CAPABILITY OF FORCES NEIGHBORING THE VITAL AND VULNERABLE KOLA PENISULA.

6. PRESS ARTICLES BY LEADING NORWEGIAN ANLYSTS AND OFFICIALS WILL HAVE ALERTED MOSCOW TO FACT THAT NORWAY IS VERY SENSITIVE TO SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE NORTH. PREVIOUS UNILATERAL NORWEGIAN PLEDGES REGARDING FOREIGN BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD ALSO HAVE ENCOURAGED MOSCOW TO HOPE IT CAN EXTRACT SOME ADDITIONAL FORM OF UNILATERAL "REASSURANCE" FROM NORWAY. THE QUESTION, SURELY, IS NOT WHETHER BUT HOW MOSCOW WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT THIS NORWEGIAN SENSITIVITY IN ORDER TO FURTHER SOVIET SECURITY AND OTHER INTERESTS DURING THE PRESENT PHASE OF SENSITIVE NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE BARENTS SEA.

7. NORWEGIANS HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY MIDDLE-LEVEL SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN OSLO TO EXPECT SOME EFFORT TO ESCALATE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS ON DELIMITING THE BARENTS SEA CONTINENTAL

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SHELF FROM TECHNICAL-LEGAL TO HIGHER POLITICAL FORUM IN WHICH
SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS CAN BE TREATED MORE DIRECTLY.
NORWEGIANS HAVE BEEN RESISTING ANY DISCUSSION OF POLITICAL
"PACKAGE DEAL"INVOLVING THE BARENTS SEA, INSISTING THAT FISHERY
AND SHELF DELIMITATION TALKS SHOULD BE KEPT SEPARATE, AND
CERTAINLY APART FROM ANY DISCUSSION OF SECURITY. THEY APPEAR
RECONCILED TO FACT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET A
BOUNDARY SETTLEMENT WITHOUT EVENTUALLY TREATING LARGER QUESTIONS
OF SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTEREST TO MOSCOW.

8. THUS FAR, SOVIET PROBES HAVE INVOLVED: A) ENTICING NOR-
WEGIANS INTO A BILATERAL DETERMINATION WITH THE USSR OF WHAT
ACTIVITY SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SENSITIVE SVALBAR-BARENTS
SEA AREA; B) EXCLUDING FOREIGN FIRMS FROM OFF-SHORE OIL OPERATIONS
IN BARENTS SEA; C) POSSIBLE JOINT SOVIET-NORWEGIAN OIL
EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION IN THE BARENTS SEA. WHILE NORWAY
HAS RESISTED BEING DRAGGED INTO BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH THE
USSR ABOUT THE SENSITIVE NORTH, IT HAS INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT
IT IS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING, UNILATERALLY, BANNING OPERATIONS
BY FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES IN THE WATERS OFF NORTH NORWAY (AN
APPROACH WHICH POSTULATES NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WHOLE
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SHELF AREA UP TO SVALBARD). BRATTELI RESISTED GIVING THE
SOVIETS A PLEDGE TO THIS EFFECT DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW,
IN PART BECAUSE NORWEGIAN POLICY ON THIS POINT HAS NOT YET BEEN
FIRMLY FORMULATED, BUT ALSO BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH
TO APPEAR TO BE MAKING CONCESSIONS TO THE SOVIETS OR ENCOURAGING
THEM TO BELIEVE THEY CAN CO-DETERMINE POLICY ON NORWAY'S
CONTINENTAL SHELF. REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, MOSCOW CAN HOPE
FOR SOME UNILATERAL CONCESSION BY NORWAY IN THE AREA OF OIL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE NORTH--BUT NOT IN DEFENSE POLICY.

9. THUS FAR, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT USSR INTENDS TO LINK
BARENTS SEA SECURITY ISSUES IN A "PACKAGE DEAL" TO ANY REGIONAL ARMS
LIMITATION SCHEME OR KEKKONEN PLAN. IN FACT, ALL THESE PRO-
POSALS WOULD HAVE LITTLE IN COMMON EXCEPT BEING A MEANS OF
TESTING NORWEGIAN DETERMINATION TO RESIST OVERTURES FROM THE
USSR AND REMAIN ALIGNED WITH NATO. BEFORE ESTABLISHING ITS
FIRM NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR THE NEXT "POLITICAL PHASE" OF
NEGOTIATIONS ON DIVISION OF THE BARENTS SEA, MOSCOW WILL
CERTAINLY BE TEMPTED TO SHAKE THE NEGOTIATING TREE TO SEE WHAT
FRUIT MAY BE RIPE FOR PLUCKING. IT MUST KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT
IF IT SHAKES TOO VIGOROUSLY, IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO TIGHTENING
NORWAY'S LINKS WITH NATO AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE NORWEGIAN
GOVERNMENT TO PUT THROUGH VERY EXPENSIVE PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE
ITS ARMED FORCES.

10. TO OVERCOME NORWEGIAN HESITANCY ABOUT ENTERING INTO ANY
SORT OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR IN THE NORTH,

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AND TO WEAKEN NORWAY'S TIES TO NATO AND GENERAL DEFENSE POSTURE-
MOSCOW'S MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON REMAINS ITS POLICY OF DETENTE.
SEEN FROM THIS STANDPOINT, THE OFFER OF A GREAT POWER GUARANTEE
NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST SCANDINAVIA MUST SEEM A
LOGICAL, ERROSIVE PROPAGANDA LINE--ONE SERVING SOVIET SHORT-
TERM AS WELL AS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES ON NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK.
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